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Abstract
On 9 February 2005, the Autorita` Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM)
and the Autorita` per l’Energia Elettrica e il Gas (AEEG) concluded a joint sector
inquiry on the progress of liberalisation in the Italian electricity market (Electric-
ity Sector inquiry). The Electricity Sector inquiry follows another joint inquiry
by the two authorities a few months earlier on the progress of liberalisation of
the natural gas market in Italy (Natural Gas Sector inquiry). The Natural Gas
Sector inquiry was published on 19 June 2004. This article summarises the find-
ings and the conclusions of both sector inquiries and describes the methodology
used by the two authorities. After several years since the beginning of both lib-
eralisation processes in both sectors, the AGCM and the AEEG find that Italian
electricity and natural gas markets still lack competitiveness and are characterised
by the presence of a dominant operator, ENEL (in the electricity sector) and ENI
(in the natural gas sector). The last part of the article summarises the reasons
which brought the AGCM to open two antitrust investigations into alleged abuses
of dominant positions against ENEL and ENI.
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Italy – energy liberalisation
Sector inquiries on the Italian electricity and natural gas markets expose
failures in both liberalisation processes.
By Antonio Capobianco*
On 9 February 2005, the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza
e del Mercato (AGCM) and the Autorità per l’Energia
Elettrica e il Gas (AEEG) concluded a joint sector inquiry on
the progress of liberalisation in the Italian electricity market
(Electricity Sector inquiry). The Electricity Sector inquiry
follows another joint inquiry by the two authorities a few
months earlier on the progress of liberalisation of the natural
gas market in Italy (Natural Gas Sector inquiry). The Natural
Gas Sector inquiry was published on 19 June 2004.
This article summarises the findings and the conclusions of
both sector inquiries and describes the methodology used by
the two authorities. After several years since the beginning of
both liberalisation processes in both sectors, the AGCM and
the AEEG find that Italian electricity and natural gas markets
still lack competitiveness and are characterised by the presence
of a dominant operator, ENEL (in the electricity sector) and
ENI (in the natural gas sector). The last part of the article
summarises the reasons which brought the AGCM to open
two antitrust investigations into alleged abuses of dominant
positions against ENEL and ENI.
The Italian sector inquiries are part of an broader review of
the energy markets currently ongoing in Europe.  The interest
in the Italian inquiries therefore lies not just in their analytical
framework and conclusions, but also in the fact that they may
well anticipate themes that will be taken over by other national
regulators and competition authorities and even by the
European Commission in its own sector inquiry in the
European energy markets.
The Electricity Sector inquiry
The main objective of the Electricity Sector inquiry was to set
up the analytical framework for the definition of the relevant
markets in the electricity sector and to measure unilateral
market power of the players acting in these markets. The
Electricity Sector inquiry did not review the conditions of
competition on the Italian market for the sale of electricity to
final users. This market will only open to competition in 2007. 
Meaning of relevant markets for antitrust purposes
From a product perspective, the Electricity Sector inquiry
identified two separate markets:
• The electricity wholesale market. This market includes all
transactions between electricity suppliers (ie national
electricity generators and electricity importers) with large
industrial clients, the single purchaser (which acquires
electricity for the non-eligible customers) and wholesalers.
This, regardless of whether such sales are made on the
centralised supply market (the power exchange) and/or in
the context of bilateral agreements.
• The dispatching services market. This is the market in which the
Transmission System Operator (TSO) acquires the capacity
required for purposes of balancing the system in view of the
grid structure. This market is indispensable for the safety of
the whole system and it has been kept distinct from the
wholesale markets for several reasons. First, all demand for
the dispatching services is from only one purchaser, the
TSO. Second, participation in the ancillary market is
mandatory for the owners of those plants that are necessary
for the stability of the system and is limited only to those
plants that have specific technical characteristics. Third,
demand is inelastic to the price, since it depends on the need
to insure the stability of the system. Finally, prices are set
through a pay-as-bid mechanism. This mechanism is
different from the system of marginal price used to set the
price on the power exchange. 
From a geographic perspective, the Electricity Sector inquiry
found that several factors plead against the wholesale product
market having a supranational dimension:
• The limited interconnection capacity between Italy and
other neighbouring countries, which is always congested.
• The existence of regulated procedures to allocate scarce
interconnection capacity.
• The structural price differences between Italy and
neighbouring countries.
According to the Electricity Sector inquiry, several factors also
plead against this market having a national dimension. In
particular, the power exchange works on a zonal basis and
prices are set on a zonal basis. This happens when the network
is congested – ie when electricity flows reach the maximum
transport capacity between different areas. In that case, the
power exchange separates the national territory in several
zones and fixes different prices to signals where the offer
should be efficiently allocated. For example, between April
and September 2004, Italy was a single price zone only for 9%
of the time.
Therefore, from a geographic perspective, four different
zones were identified as relevant geographic markets: Sardinia,
Macro-Sicily (which includes Sicily and Calabria), the North
and finally the rest of Italy (known as the Macro-South). 
Assessment of unilateral market power – structural
indices 
On the basis of the above definitions, the Electricity Sector
inquiry proceeded to assess the market position of each player
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on the basis of its market share, the CR4 index and the HHI
index. 
Based on these traditional concentration indices, the
Electricity Sector inquiry concluded that ENEL, the former
electricity monopoly, had retained a leading (dominant)
position in the Italian market despite the legislative efforts to
create the conditions for a more competitive environment. 
ENEL appeared to be the first operator in terms of market
shares in the Northern wholesale market, in the Macro-South
and in Macro-Sicily. The HHI index in all the markets showed
that these markets are highly concentrated and, in some cases,
of a quasi-monopolistic structure. 
Other structural indicators confirmed ENEL’s leading role
in the wholesale electricity markets:
• ENEL’s market share of the overall domestic production is
just below 50%.
• In terms of type of generation plants, ENEL owns
approximately 56% of the total efficient capacity installed
in Italy. More specifically, ENEL owns 46% of the total
base-load capacity, 63% of the mid-merit capacity and 96%
of the peak-load capacity, giving it an unmatched
advantage in the supply of peak demand. ENEL is the only
electricity generating company with a mix of plants
equally distributed between the various type of plants.
• In terms of geographic spread, ENEL owns 47% of the
capacity installed in the North, 72% of the capacity
installed in the Macro-South, 52% of the capacity installed
in Macro-Sicily and 39% of the capacity installed in
Sardinia, making ENEL the only generating company with
plants equally distributed throughout the country.
As for the dispatching services market, the analysis showed an
even more concentrated market structure than that of the
wholesale market. ENEL is by a long way the largest operator
in terms of market shares: in each zone, ENEL’s market share
is well above 50% (in some cases it is close to 90%). 
Assessment of unilateral market powering the
wholesale markets – pivotal index
Next to the traditional structural indexes, the Electricity
Sector inquiry introduces the notion of pivotal operator,
which is more commonly used by energy regulators. A pivotal
operator is an operator whose supply of electricity is necessary
to meet the residual local demand on a given market. Residual
local demand equates to the hourly demand for electricity on
the relevant market, net of imports from abroad less the
generating capacity of all other competitors on the same
geographic market. 
Because the supply by the pivotal firm is necessary to meet
local demand, such a firm is also considered to have the power
to fix the price in the relevant market. Given the zonal
configuration of the Italian wholesale electricity market, one
operator can have a pivotal role in a given zone if:
• the import capacity from neighbouring markets is not used
in total or in part; or 
• the export capacity towards neighbouring countries is used
in total or in part.
The pivotal index calculates the number of hours when a
certain operator is pivotal. According to data available to the
two authorities, in a given period, ENEL turned out to be a
pivotal operator for 100% of the hours on the Macro-South
market; for 44% of the hours in the North market, for 29% of
the hours in Sardinia; and for 24% of the hours in Macro-
Sicily. Other operators also turned out to be absolutely
indispensable (ie pivotal), but to a much more limited extent:
ENDESA was indispensable for 67% of the hours in the
Sardinian market and EDIPOWER for 19% of the hours on
the Macro-Sicily market. 
ENELs’ pivotal role was emphasised by the fact that if one
were to join together neighbouring zones, ENEL’s pivotal
position would show an even higher degree of market power:
• In the North and Macro-South markets, ENEL was able
to set the wholesale price during 95% of the hours. 
• In the Macro-South and Macro-Sicily markets, ENEL was
able to set the wholesale price during 91% of the hours. 
• Finally, in the Macro-South and Sardinian markets, ENEL
was able to set the wholesale price during 63% of the
hours.
No other competitor of ENEL had the power to fix the
wholesale market price of electricity on the North and
Macro-South markets.
ENEL’s pivotal role and dominance in electricity
wholesale markets
While a dominant firm on the relevant wholesale market is
also considered to be a pivotal enterprise, the opposite is not
always true. In fact, a firm is pivotal when its supply is
necessary to satisfy zonal demand and to guarantee market
equilibrium, irrespective of the amount of residual demand
supplied and the time period over which the residual demand
is supplied by the pivotal firm. Therefore, under certain
circumstances, even a generator with a small market share can
be indispensable to bridge the gap between supply and
demand on a given zonal market, at a given time. 
According to the case law of the European Court of Justice,
the concept of dominance implies more stringent conditions,
namely the power to fix price and to behave independently
from competitors, clients and final customers. This means that
in order to find dominance in the wholesale electricity market
a competition authority has to find:
• a stability in the exercise of market power for a sufficiently
long time period; and 
• a market share (residual demand supplied) that is
sufficiently large so that its market strategies cannot be
replicated by other competitors.
According to the antitrust criteria for finding dominance, the
Electricity Sector inquiry concluded that ENEL is dominant
in the following wholesale electricity markets in Italy: the
Northern markets, the Macro-South market and Sicily. On
the Sardinian market, ENEL and ENDESA were found to be
part of a duopoly.
The recommendations formulated by the two
authorities
In order to promote more competition in the Italian
electricity wholesale market, a number of structural measures
were put forward by the two authorities:
• To favour investments on the national transmission grid, in
order to reduce interzonal congestions to the minimum
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and to ensure that the new generation capacity that will be
installed in the coming years will provide a real
opportunity to compete with the dominant operator.
• To invest in increasing interconnection capacity with
neighbouring countries and to promote the installation of
direct lines.
• To encourage the creation of new production sites,
particularly in those zonal markets where demand is
currently not fully met.
• To adopt measures to remove or minimise incentives to
the exercise of individual or collective market power, in
particular during the interim period before a more
competitive supply structure is established.
• To prevent production capacity being removed from the
market.
In addition, a number of incentives have been proposed to
develop a more competitive supply of electricity. These
measures are aimed at preserving the market position of energy
suppliers vis-à-vis ENEL and to guarantee the development of
a stable and healthy energy market in the coming years.
The Natural Gas Sector inquiry
As was the case in the Electricity Sector inquiry, the Natural
Gas Sector inquiry concluded that the liberalisation of the
Italian market for natural gas has not achieved the expected
results. 
Despite the fact that the Italian legislator went beyond the
minimum level of liberalisation required by Directive
98/30/CE, the general competitive conditions of the market
did not show any major improvement in the 2000-2004
period. On the contrary, industrial gas prices increased by
approximately 20% compared to the European average and no
long-term, committed entry into the Italian gas market has
occurred since 2000.
ENI’s dominant position
The two authorities concluded that this poor state of
competition was mainly due to the existence of an
unchallenged dominant position held by the ENI group in the
following relevant markets:
• Wholesale supply (including imports and national
production). 
• International transportation (ENI controls all the four
pipelines carrying gas to Italy from North Europe, Russia,
Algeria and Libya and the only existing LNG terminal).
• National transportation (this is a regulated legal monopoly
held by a subsidiary of ENI, Snam Rete Gas).
• Storage of gas in depleted underground fields (regulated
monopoly of Stogit, another subsidiary of ENI).
• Retail sales to industrial, thermal and domestic consumers
at a national level.
The inquiry found that, in 2004, all importers of natural gas
(with the exception of ENEL) purchased gas from ENI at the
border at a price higher than that paid by ENI to its own
suppliers (such as Gaszprom, Sonatrach and the Norwegian
producers). These shippers, therefore, being at the same time
ENI’s clients upstream and ENI’s competitors downstream,
were therefore considered to be seriously undermined in their
ability to compete on the final sale market for natural gas. 
The inquiry also found that, in order to develop a healthy
competitive environment, it is essential to promote entry of
new operators independent from ENI, which can supply gas
on competitive terms and conditions to the Italian market.
The inquiry also suggests that entry should be pursued under
short-term supply contracts rather than long-term take-or-pay
contracts. 
The recommendations formulated by the two
authorities
In order to promote competition in the Italian natural gas
market, the two authorities suggested the implementation of
the following measures:
• The creation of an Independent System Operator (ISO) to
control access to domestic and international pipelines and
storage facilities.
• The development of a standardised product wholesale
market for gas, through a centralised gas (a gas exchange).
• New investments by ENI to favour the increase of import
capacity of existing facilities.
• The development of new LNG regasification facilities
through the realisation of at least two new independent
terminals.
• A gas release scheme, under which ENI could assign
adequate supplies of gas for supply near cost price, without
further controlling the buyers’ gas activities downstream.
• A contract release scheme, under which existing long-term
supply contracts should be transferred to third parties, in
order to increase the positive effects that the new Directive
2003/55/EC is expected to bring once it is transposed into
Italian law. It is recognised that such a measure would
probably require appropriate legislation. 
Recent investigations into alleged abuses of
dominant position by ENEL and ENI
It is interesting to note that the analysis made in both the
Electricity and the Natural Gas Sector inquiries was
immediately used by the AGCM to support and strengthen its
antitrust enforcement activity.  
As a consequence of the findings in the two sector inquiries,
in the course of 2005, the AGCM opened two separate
antitrust investigations against ENEL and ENI for alleged
abuses of their respective dominant positions in the electricity
and natural gas markets. 
Alleged abuses by ENI – market foreclosure by
refusal to increase import capacity
On 27 January 2005, the AGCM opened an investigation into
alleged abusive conduct by ENI aimed at preventing the entry
into the Italian gas sale market of ENI’s competitors (in
Bollettino AGCM 4/2005).
According to the decision opening the investigation, ENI
had decided to increase the transport capacity of its gas
pipeline from Oued Saf Saf (on the Algerian border) to Cap
Bon on the Mediterranean coast, which is the main pipeline
for the import of Algerian gas into Italy. ENI has exclusive
long-term transport rights over the gas pipeline, which is
owned by the Tunisian state.
Between 2002 and 2003, ENI had decided to increase the
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transport capacity of the Algerian gas pipeline, which had by
then reached its level of saturation. ENI received many
requests from independent gas shippers to co-finance the
increase of transport capacity. It therefore established a
procedure for the pro rata allocation of the additional capacity
between the interested shippers. Following this procedure,
ENI entered into ship-or-pay transport agreements with a
number of shippers, which agreed to share the investment in
new capacity and to start importing gas into Italy as of 2007-
2008, subject to a number of conditions. Four shippers met
the conditions.
According to the evidence obtained by the AGCM, ENI
subsequently sent a letter to the shippers who had entered into
the ship-or-pay transport agreements, informing them that it
could not pursue the pro rata allocation of the new capacity
because of changed conditions in the Italian gas market as
from 2007. In particular, ENI claimed that the revised
forecasts on the medium-term gas supply and demand
prospects in Italy were now such that, if the four new shippers
were to import gas as of 2007-2008, the Italian gas market
would be in a situation of oversupply threatening ENI’s
commercial position in the downstream market and
consequently its ability to meet the take-or-pay obligations in
its own gas supply agreements.
According to the AGCM, ENI’s refusal to pursue further the
expansion of the import capacity on the Algerian pipeline can
only be justified by the commercial attempt to prevent the
entry into the Italian market of four new suppliers. The
AGCM therefore decided to investigate whether such strategy
amounts to an exclusionary abuse of ENI’s dominant position
under article 82 of the EC Treaty, with the effect of
hampering and/or preventing the entry of independent
operators into the Italian wholesale market for the supply of
natural gas. 
The investigation will be concluded by 31 December 2005.
Alleged abuses by ENEL - leveraging and pricing
strategies
In April 2005, the AGCM decided to open formal
proceedings against ENEL for alleged infringement of article
82 of the EC Treaty (in Bollettino AGCM 14/2005). The
investigation originated in a referral by the energy regulator
(AEEG) to the AGCM on ENEL’s pricing behaviour on the
power exchange (in particular, on the day-ahead market). 
The alleged anticompetitive behaviour of ENEL was found
to have consisted in raising its rivals’ costs in the wholesale
markets, by fixing prices in different zonal wholesale markets
so as to put its competitors in the Northern and Sardinian
markets at a competitive disadvantage. In particular, the
AGCM is investigating whether the fact that ENEL has
lowered prices in areas where its competitors were present, but
kept prices high in the zones where ENEL was almost a
monopolist, could amount to an abuse of its dominant
position.
According to the AGCM, ENEL seems to have exploited its
power to set prices in the Macro-South geographic area where
it is absolutely indispensable (ie pivotal), in order to affect the
import/export flows from this zone towards the bordering
interconnecting zones. It is alleged that the only purpose of
this pricing strategy is to keep prices extremely high, and
therefore extend ENEL’s ability to dictate the wholesale price
on separate but neighbouring geographic markets. According
to the decision opening the investigation, since the
establishment of the power exchange on 1 April 2004, ENEL
has used its ability to set prices in order to pre-emptively
discipline its competitors so as to eliminate any risk that the
liberalisation would lead to the creation of truly competitive
markets. 
According to the information available to the AGCM,
ENEL has apparently changed its strategy in January 2005,
starting to set prices uniformly across the zones. According to
the AGCM, the fact that ENEL now has a single unitary price
across the various zones is part of ENEL’s overall foreclosing
strategy. After an initial punitive phase, which was aimed at
indicating to competitors that ENEL had the power to
influence the competitive conditions on the various markets,
ENEL adopted a more lenient strategy. In this phase, starting
in January 2005, ENEL allowed its competitors to enjoy
higher prices uniformly spread through all national territories.
According to the AGCM, this strategy is aimed at signalling to
ENEL’s competitors that any aggressive strategy is bound to
fail since ENEL, the dominant company on the market, will
immediately adapt its pricing strategy and punish its rivals.
The investigation will be concluded by 31 March 2006.
Energy liberalisation in the spotlight 
After years of legislative activity at EC and national level to
adopt and implement legislation allowing for the liberalisation
of the electricity and natural gas markets in Europe and
ultimately for the creation of a single European market for
energy, it is hardly surprising that these are now subject to
scrutiny as to their effects.
The Italian sector inquiries are just one example of national
regulators and competition authorities revisiting the progress
made in this area:
• After reviewing the status of the electricity markets in
Ireland, the Irish Commission for Energy Regulation has
recently claimed that the failure to create a truly
competitive electricity market in Ireland is the cause of a
structural lack of electricity generating capacity in the
country. The Irish authorities have concluded that the
non-emergence of a domestic market is particularly
disappointing after many years of planning. 
• At the beginning of 2005, the German Federal Cartel
Office (FCO) has launched a public discussion on the
legality of the prices charged to end customers and of the
long-term gas supply contracts under German competition
law. This position of the FCO is summarised in a
discussion paper. The conclusion of the review process –
to which all interested parties have participated – will be
presented to the industry and to the European
Commission, and will form the basis for adjustments,
where necessary, of the general principles of evaluation
applied by the FCO in this area.
The European Commission has also been extremely active in
promoting the full implementation of the electricity and natural
gas liberalisation, initiating administrative proceedings against
those member states who had delayed the implementation of
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either (or both) the Directive on the Internal Electricity Market
(Directive 2003/54/CE) or/and the Directive on the Internal
Gas Market (Directive 2003/55/CE) (see Commission Press
Release IP/05/319). These two directives are fundamental to
the opening up of the electricity and gas markets in the EU,
providing freedom of choice of supplier for industrial customers
as of 1 July 2004 and for domestic customers as of 1 July 2007.
The directives combine opening up to competition while
maintaining service quality, universal service, the protection of
vulnerable customers and the objectives of security of supply.
The underlying objective is to make Europe more competitive,
by reducing basic energy costs.
As noted at the outset, the European Commission is now
launching a European sector inquiry focusing on the progress
of liberalisation of the electricity and gas sectors in Europe.
The inquiry is likely to be the occasion for the Commission to
draw a detailed picture of the status of competition in all
phases of the electricity and natural gas industries in Europe.
It will be interesting to see what will happen then. Judging by
the Italian experience, we may expect both calls for specific
responses (eg building new connections, storage facilities, etc.
to promote competition and European integration) and, in the
light of what the Commission will learn, probably also a new
wave of antitrust cases where companies’ behaviour is found
to be the obstacle to the full implementation of the
liberalisation directives (although admittedly such issues are
not straightforward, as restrictions may reflect necessary
protection for investments).  
In this context, the recent experiences of member states like
Italy matter. The Commission is likely to follow national
examples in structuring the scope of its inquiry and may also
make use of their analytical tools (such as the pivotal index) to
analyse and define the energy markets.  One may expect such
tools to be discussed and agreed in wider forums of national
regulators and spread further across Europe.  In the
Modernisation Regulation 1/03 era, the European
Competition Network and its subcommittee on energy offers
such opportunity already.
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